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Introduction
For over a century economic geographers and those in related disciplines have sought to better understand processes of industrial localization. Myriad theories with origins in numerous disciplines have sought to explain why firms in particular sectors of the economy, and in particular places in the world locate together. Policymakers seeking to foster regional economic growth have consulted these theories, some have proved useful, other less so, and much has been ignored. Michael Porter's cluster theory, however, has been adopted above all others by policymakers the world over.
His approach is built on the concept of competitive advantage and has been utilised as a development tool by the EU, OECD, national governments, regional development agencies and local authorities around the world. This level of popularity with policymakers is rarely seen emanating from academia, and it is a particularly impressive feat given the level of criticism his theory has attracted. Numerous academics have written about the conceptual flaws in Porter's work (Martin and Sunley, 2003; Taylor, 2010) , but regional economic development policy over the past two decades, until recently at least, has been dominated by clusters. Despite libraries of incredibly useful books and articles on clusters, there remains an absence of work which interrogates the translation of clusters into, and then through local and national policy. The aim of this paper is to go some way to remedying the situation by examining how that has happened in the UK context.
The life (or more accurately lives) of clusters have been described as 'elusive' (Malmberg and Maskell, 2002) and 'chaotic' (Martin and Sunley, 2003) and it is only relatively recently this complexity has begun to be unpacked (Benneworth and Henry, 2004; Vorley, 2008) . By way of example Maskell and Kabir (2006) identify over 1300 academic papers mentioning clusters between 1990 -2004 , and Martin and Sunley's (2003 paper critiquing clusters has been cited over 340 times (Web of Knowledge, 2011) . To help map the journey of clusters into and through UK economic development policy actor-network theory (ANT) is adopted as an explanatory framework. ANT is particularly useful to follow the story of clusters because it focuses "on how things are 'stitched together' across divisions and distinctions" (Murdoch, 1997: 321) , in this case the intertwining of academics in a number of cognate disciplines (business studies, economic, and economic geography), policymakers, knowledges, concepts, evidence and policy.
In mobilizing such a framework the limitations of pure ANT method are acknowledged. As O'Neill and Whatmore (2000: 124) explain ANT is not an "'off-the-peg' theoretical template which can be imported to frame the story in some formulaic way", rather is provides 'rules of method' which can be applied to better understand complex networks of relations (Lagendijk and Cornford, 2000) . Lagendijk and Cornford use these rules to explore the growth of a regional development industry. Their paper takes a general examination of how two concepts -clusters and learning regions -have been enrolled into regional development policy. This paper is a useful starting point both in methodological and empirical terms.
What is missing, however, is an illustration of the how real policy and policymakers became enrolled in a clusters actor-network.
The basic premise of ANT allows this by 'following the actors' and their heterogeneous relationships within a network (Latour, 1997) . Importantly, actors are not just individual people, but include organizations, artifacts, knowledges and concepts: "[a]ctors can be defined as any entity able to associate texts, humans, non-humans and money" (Callon, 1991, p. 140) . Without going into too much detail (see Murdoch, 1995; 1998 for its use in geography) it is necessary to introduce three key elements to aid the following explanation: translation, alignment and black boxes.
Translation is the process by which actors are drawn, or enrolled, into actor-networks.
Through negotiation actors become aligned or disciplined to the same way of thinking and acting. This occurs as actors "appeal to other actors, to enroll them, to mobilise them, and to align and fix interest relationships" (Lagendijk and Cornford, 2000: 211) . This happens as "actors (1) construct common definitions and meanings, (2) define representativities, and (3) co-opt each other in the pursuit of individual and collective objectives" (Bardini, 1997: online). Transformation of actors as this occurs is an important process to allow alignment to be achieved: actors gain 'shape and function' as they a disciplined in a network (Murdoch, 1997) , and these function might be multiple.
When alignment is at its strongest a network is stabilized and what Latour (1988) terms 'black boxes' can form. This happens when sets of knowledges, technologies, ways of acting become so established they are no longer questioned: "[a] black box contains that which no longer needs to be considered, those things whose contents have become a matter of indifference" (Callon and Latour, 1981 p.285 ). The result is certain ways of thinking or acting, particular knowledges or technologies become 'obligatory passage points' that must be passed through and accepted to form an actor-network (Clegg, 1997).
A major weakness of using ANT is the lack of context it reveals. Callon (1999) seeks to address this with the idea of framing actors' relations and disconnections. Lagendijk and Cornford (2000) take this further by drawing on Clegg's (1997) work on combining theories of organization fields with ANT. Organisational fields can be thought of as collections of similarly acting organisations, and provides a useful way to think about the context or background in and through which actor-networks form. They also provide ways to consider from where power emanates as it circulates and is used by key intermediaries -or 'relay agents' -in processes of translation, transformation and black boxing (Lagendijk and Cornford, 2000) .
To help organize this story of clusters a linear narrative is set out in this paper as a heuristic device to trace their spread through UK policy chronologically, and the explanation is, therefore, necessarily simplified and partial. What is revealed, however, is an account of how Porter aligned himself with a regional development field which at the end of the 20 th century had transformed itself into an industry compatible with the ideas Porter was promoting (sections 2 and 3). This alignment of ideas and objectives was paralleled around the world and in the case of the UK saw central and regional government enrolled into a clusters actornetwork (section 4). Academics were less easily enrolled, but the drive for greater entrepreneurship in universities and the shear popularity of Porter's concept meant academics became, if somewhat reluctantly, part of the network (section 5). Academics' critique of clusters, together with the advance of alternative theories has seen the influence of cluster decline in recent recent years (section 6).
Porterian Clusters
Michael Porter is an American business economist. In 1990 he published The Competitive
Advantage of Nations, a book which built on his earlier work on competition (Porter, 1979) and sought to explain the conditions which allow countries to accrue competitive advantage in particular business activities. Porter conceptualised a 'competitive diamond' (Figure 1 ) of factors that, he claimed, influence a country's competitive performance in international markets (Porter, 1990 ). (Porter, 1990) He subsequently developed this theory arguing that the interactions in the competitive diamond are more intensive, and therefore more effective when firms operate in close proximity (Porter, 1996; Porter, 1998a; 1998b) . As evidence of this he pointed to the fact that clusters of firms in similar industries are "strikingly common around the world" and that a country's most globally successful firms are likely to be clustered (Porter, 1990: 120) . He also suggested 99% of employment in US regional economies is concentrated in local clusters (Porter, 2001 ; see also Martin and Sunley, 2003) . At this scale, he argued, clusters of firms can generate competitive advantages from enhanced productivity levels, higher innovation and new business formation (Porter, 1998b) .
For policymakers, understanding these factors is achieved through cluster mapping exercises, which form the first stage of any cluster development strategy, and are designed to identify existing and potential clusters. Once a cluster has been identified its strengths and "[w] hile the book is set at the level of the nation, the same framework can and has been readily applied at the regional, state, and city level" (xxi). The increased prominence of networks in economic development, and notably theories of innovation led Porter to shift his ideas again so "the cluster concept could be absorbed within regional development agendas" (Lagendijk and Cornford, 2000: 214) . In the early to mid-1990s, then, we see Porter aligning the cluster concept, and in turn himself, with regional policy makers. To appreciate this more fully, to understand the transformation of policy makers to a clusters way of thinking, and thus explain how Porter's ideas became so dominant, it is necessary to examine the organisation field of regional policy making.
Regional Policy Making and Porter's Popularity
Martin and Sunley (2003) To begin with Porter's work proposed a shift of focus from the macroeconomic conditions for growth to the microeconomic foundations for growth and explicitly outlined the role of policymakers in building these foundations. This chimed with policymakers working in a changing economic governance regime. After the Second World War economic development approaches in the developed world were underpinned by a 'spatial Keynesianism' characterised by government intervention to balance economic prosperity between better and poorer performing regions through redistributive investment, welfare payments and demand-led incentive policies (Tomaney, 2008; see also Brenner et al., 2003; Tickell and Peck, 2003) . The forces which revealed the importance of regionalized industrial districtsthe hollowing out of the nation state, the rise of neo-liberalism and associated approaches to regulation (Amin, 2001; Jessop, 2002) -also revealed the incompatibility of spatial Keynesianism with the new economic world order. This led to a rethink of how to foster economic development in a way that allowed regional economies to flourish (Whitford and Potter, 2007) . In the UK the Conservative government elected in 1979 halted planned industrial policy and privatized large portions of nationalized industry. This ushered in a new approach to economic development policy along with an increased emphasis on attracting foreign investment. In parallel with these shifts, the Thatcher government centralized control over local authority expenditure, prompting the latter to seek new strategies for local and regional economic development (Lagendijk and Charles, 1999 (Lagendijk and Cornford, 2000) .
Second, clusters provided a way to balance endogenous development and inward investment. In turn, collaboration between domestically and internationally owned firms could increase the benefits of inward investment, criticised in some quarters for being too footloose, by embedding it in regional economies through clusters. It was also hoped small firms would learn from their larger counterparts as collaborative and supplier-buyer networks developed and, in a best case scenario, local spin-offs could be created automatically rooted within a region.
Third, clusters took a more holistic approach to industrial development by focusing on vertically and horizontally integrated strategic groups rather than the traditional, strictly defined sectoral groupings of previous industrial policy ( Roelandt and den Hertog, 1999) .
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Such groupings allowed for shared research and development capacity, and permitted policymakers to claim they were achieving the latest buzzword concepts such as innovation, competition, synergistic growth and associational economies which go along with high-tech and research intensive oriented clusters (Hospers and Beugelsdijk, 2002) .
Fourth, some policymakers and practitioners could create jobs for themselves as a regional service class emerged. This group ensured its own continued existence by promoting and reproducing clusters, creating new development agencies and related new regionalist style policies (see Lovering, 1999; . In part, this was spurred by new approaches to funding regional development, particularly from the European Union. Projects focusing on innovation and networking, and organized with an emphasis on partnership working and policymakers acting as facilitators of growth, emerged as the model for the regional development industry (Lagendijk and Cornford, 2000) .
Fifth, as well as political factors Porter sets out ideas which are generic and flexible enough to be relevant to a range of contexts, and thus are attractive to policymakers on a practical level. His definition of a cluster is undoubtedly broad and thus policymakers and 1 Although it has been argued that some forms of cluster policy differ little from industrial policy approaches (Hospers, Sautet and Desrochers, 2008) .
practitioners can use its "all-embracing universalistic notion" of firms working together doing similar things in the same place to form policy responses to changing economic conditions (Paniccia, 2006: 90) . This is aided on a practical level clusters came with a readymade methodological tool box. The methods, case studies and exemplars contained in
Porter's books offered provided apparent 'off-the-peg' examples of how this could be done. This constellation of factors and related actors combined and (trans)formed into an ever growing actor-network of cluster-related policy frameworks, growth objectives, ways of fostering development, organisations, consultancies and knowledges that blackboxed cluster theory as the approach for regional economic development.
Cluster Policy in the UK
With policymakers convinced of cluster theory's usefulness, how has it been mobilised in Within six years of coming to power, and nine years after the Regional Policy Commission reported, New Labour had made increased productivity and competitiveness the key goal for economic development, and clusters the de facto tool to achieve this. Millions of pounds had been spent on their development, and numerous government agencies, along with the university sector, were involved in delivering and monitoring cluster policy. The interests of national and regional policy makers has been aligned with Porter, Monitor and other clusteractors to combine a set of knowledges, actions and texts about regional growth. These actors had constructed common definitions of clusters and their operation, and translated their collective objectives into the pursuit of a particular kind of regional development through clusters. Cluster theory had been black boxed in the UK policy arena as this network 'acted as one' in the mobilization of clusters in policy.
Academics and Clusters
The story outlined in the previous section is only part of the journey clusters have taken through the 1990s and 2000s. To fully understand clusters one also needs to consider their relationship with academia because, in contrast to policy makers, academics have not been so easily aligned.
Academics have been concerned with territorial production complexes such as clusters for decades. In the 1980s there was a resurgence of interest in the region as a scale of economic organisation and a key concept for policy intervention (Storper, 1995; MacKinnon et al., 2002) . Libraries of research on variously termed agglomerations, industrial districts, regional innovation systems, learning regions and clusters, amongst others, emerged as academics sought to explain how regionally embedded networks of firms operated. Unlike Porter's theory, however, policymakers ignored much of this work as it was not aimed at them, nor was it written in accessible terms. Achieving policy relevance has long been difficult to economic geographers (Pollard et al., 2000; Martin, 2001; Dorling and Shaw, 2002; Ward, 2005) , and the attention Porter's clusters got from policymakers prompted many to examine and mobilise his concepts in academic analyses. In addition, during the 1990s and 2000s
universities were under pressure to attract income from sources beyond their traditional funding streams and be more entrepreneurial. Undertaking consultancy-like work was an attractive way to do this and many academics met the demand from policymakers for cluster mapping studies. Through academic and consultancy research, then, economic geographers and those in cognate disciplines began to be enrolled into the actor-network of clusters. The power of the cluster brand so successful in selling the concept to policymakers also had an impact on academic work on territorial production complexes as addressing Porterian clusters became an obligatory passage point for work on regional development, not because of its usefulness, but their success and place at the centre of economic policy meant it could not be ignored. Crucially, though, the concept had heterogeneous relationships with, and meaning for different actors. To put it crudely, policymakers were far more convinced than academics of their value 2 . That is not to say all policymakers were convinced, or that all academics were not, however.
The critical approach of academics threatened to destabilize the place of clusters in regional development as they opened up the black box and began to critique Porter's work. (1998b: 199) . With this in mind, Martin and Sunley (2003) pose the question: just how important is geographical proximity in clusters? Further, Porter maintains competition is key to the success of clusters. But again, Martin and Sunley (2003: 15) point out that the competitive strategies that Porter's concept of competition is built on -differentiation, cost leadership and focus -are largely generic and have been criticised by business, industrial and management studies scholars for being superficial, hard to measure, unspecific, not independent or universal as Porter claimed.
various settings, and adapted, transformed, and redefined what constituted a cluster. This is the way academics work, of course, refining concepts through their use and it led to an array of definitions (see Martin and Sunley, 2003; Belussi, 2006) . A great deal of this work was robust and useful (see, for example, Henry, Pinch and Russell 1996; Henry and Pinch, 2000; Bassett, Griffiths and Smith, 2002; Nachum and Keeble, 2003) , but too frequently cluster mapping failed to properly identify and understand the links, spillovers and flows within an industry and outside a region (Bahelt, Malmberg and Maskell, 2004; Dunford and Greco, 2006; Saxenian, 2006) . On the one hand Porter's original theory is generalisable, which makes it useful to policymakers as a starting point to understand the linkages between firms in a locale -aided by the competitive diamond and supply chain analysis framework. On the other hand, this generalisability means the theory is conceptually elastic. This has provided the opportunity for academics and policymakers to stretch it beyond normal limits, often combining it with other explanations of agglomeration (Benneworth and Henry, 2004; Vorley, 2008) . A tension can be identified here for academics trying to balance academic rigour and conceptual development, demands of clients with potentially different understandings of clusters, and the drive for relevance outside the academy. In ANT terms these motivations are not mutually exclusive and academics can have multiple roles as critics and legitimisers of Porterian cluster theory.
The search for a coherent definition was unsuccessful, and by the mid-2000s the term 'cluster' was being used to describe used to "refer to a localized industry configuration, such as a local or regional concentration of industrial firms, and their support infrastructure which are closely interrelated through traded and untraded interdependencies" (Bahelt, 2005: 205 ).
Porter's cluster concept was now so big it had engulfed decades of academic work. Such 'sloppy thinking', however, led academics to describe the cluster concept as 'fuzzy' (Markusen, 1999) , 'chaotic' (Martin and Sunley, 2003 ) and a 'conceptual headache' (Malmberg and Power, 2006) . These critiques have focused on methodological issues, attacking the use of ungeneralisable case studies and hard to measure 'soft' features (Markusen, 1999) , a lack of clarity in definitions (Martin and Sunley, 2003) , under explanation of key characteristics (Nooteboom, 2006) , ambiguous use of labels (Belussi, 2006) , and confusing application of previously developed concepts (Malmberg and Power, 2006) . As Taylor puts it, "the cluster model has been built through the accretion of layer upon layer of contingency generated through the interpretation, re-interpretation, conjecture and extrapolation of stylised facts buttressed by weak empiricism" (Taylor, 2010: 276) . So while academics were enrolled into a clusters actor-network, they were done so reluctantly and alignment was difficult meaning the network became destabilized resulting, as the next section illustrates, in the decline of clusters as a policy tool.
Where is cluster policy now?
Cluster had their peak for policymakers in the UK in the mid-2000s. In 2004 New Labour's regional strategy took a major hit as the people of the North East of England rejected proposals for an elected regional assembly that would have seen more power devolved to the regional level. Plans for further referenda in other regions were abandoned. In the years that followed, the scale at which regional development policy was focused shifted, moving from regions to city-regions as an accountable scale of intervention was sought. This period saw a confusing array of approaches to foster economic competitiveness emerge, operating at different and often conflicting scales (see Valler and Carpenter, 2010 Porter has declined. Clusters still feature, but as part of a range of policy interventions for local, regional and national growth. This is in part due to criticism of Porter's approach, an increasing evidence base of poorly executed cluster policy, the rise in popularity of other approaches which revealed the growing significance of cities, and the need to combine productivity focused interventions with housing, planning and transport policy 4 . But mainly due to widespread acceptance of the advantages of firm proximity and specialization in general, outwith of Porter's theory (Spencer et al., 2010) . This appreciation is part of a wider trend seen in the work of, and engagement from policymakers with economists concerned with so-called New Economic Geography (NEG). The blackbox of clusters has been opened and exposed to a critical light that destabilized the actor-network. One could conceive this as clusters being absorbed into a new network of knowledges, concepts and tools for regional development. Indeed, the enrolment of NEG into the policy field, and economic geographers' reaction to it bares striking similarity to the journey outlined above.
Conclusion
By way of conclusion let us address the use of ANT as an explanatory tool for telling stories such as these. First, this article has told a necessarily simplified, partial, and in places crude, 4 See the Review of Sub-national Economic Development and Regeneration (HM Treasury, 2007) .
story of clusters through policy and academia. A pure ANT approach means "following networks all the way along their length" (Murdoch, 1997: 332) , but the number of actors connected to the cluster concept is huge. As highlighted in the introduction there have been at least 1600 academic articles mentioning clusters from 1990 until the time of writing (Malmberg and Maskell, 2002; Martin and Sunley's, 2003; Web of Knowledge, 2011) . As these numbers indicate tracing such a network completely is an impossible task. Moreover, dealing with the complexity of ideas and actions of actors would take a lifetime and always be only a partial explanation. But by taking a relational or associational perspective, even a partial one, light can be shed on the role of myriad actors in making a concept, if not successful, then at least popular (Lagendijk, 2003) . This has been done successfully by scholars positing a multi-perspectival approach to understanding the black box of clusters (Benneworth and Henry, 2004) .
Importantly, there is a need to reject the idea "there is no need to step outside the networks for all the qualities of spatial construction and configuration of interest will be found therein" (Murdoch, 1997: 332) . A fuller, more useful account can only be achieved by examining the organisation fields in and through which actor-networks gain meaning (Clegg, 1997; Lagendijk and Cornford, 2000) . In this case I have attempted to do this by examining the wider UK policy and academic arenas, and their transformations. Combining
Clegg's work on organisation fields with ANT also helps understand the multiple roles of different actors, their heterogeneous relationships and motivations within and outwith actor-networks. Academics acting as consultants, for example, helped legitimise and reproduce clusters, while colleagues heavily critiqued the concept because of pressures to be entrepreneurial and engage beyond the academy. Similarly, not all policymakers were convinced of clusters' efficacy, but were bound by central government to foster them. The
